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CANADA and CHRISTENDOM

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EDITORIAL

THE SPIRIT GIVETH LIFE

At the recent mission held in Trinity College Toronto, one question was raised by students with significant regularity. It was not a question which grew out of "second year agnosticism;" nor did it relate to "religion and science"; nor was it concerned with the Christian view of Marxism. Rather it sprang from the stubborn refusal of many non church-going students to believe that the Christian Faith was inextricably bound up with regular attendance at Sunday morning Matins. This emphatic expression of distaste for the traditional Anglican service cannot merely be dismissed as a poor excuse for sleeping late on Sunday mornings. There is more to it than that. The people who register these complaints, irritating as they may be, are

reminding us of one fact that cannot be overlooked: that the Anglican Church is notorious for the dry formalism of its worship, a formalism which seems to extend into every area of its life. It is this failing which must drive any conscientious Christian to despair. It is this weakness which is responsible for the existence of any number of splinter groups which have broken away from the Church in vigorous protest. And it is also responsible - in part, at least - for the great army of "backyard Christians" who have lost all contact with corporate Christian life.

When we view this problem against the background of history, however, we see that it is not a new one. On the contrary, it seems that there are two chronic diseases which afflict the body of the Church in every age. The first of these, the one with which we are acutely concerned to-day, might be called "formalism" or "externalism" - the tendency to pervert the outward and visible forms, the externals of church life and organization - into final ends. We find this weakness in almost every century, but wherever we find it, it is accompanied by a cry of protest; a warning that the Christian religion must never degenerate into mere form. This kind of protest is the mark of genuine Protestantism. It is the mark of the protestant spirit which has, since the time of the prophets, directed itself against every corruption of religious life. The protestant spirit in this sense can never be surrendered, and in the twentieth century, it must concern itself not with the problem of candles on the altar, or Eucharistic vestments, but with the really dangerous kinds of externalism. It must attack the idea, for instance, that the size of a congregation is the test of spiritual vigour. It must attack those who define the Church's mission as the battle against Communism, and who appeal for funds because the Church is a useful check on juvenile delinquency - as one Canadian diocese advertised in its Church extension program. It must seek to reform the very structure of our worship itself, to make it an essential, powerful and meaningful expression of the Christian Faith. The true Protestant will do all these things and more, but he will also remember that the protestant spirit alone is not sufficient. And here we come to the second disease which constantly threatens to disrupt the Church's life. In Dr. Tillich's recent lecture in Toronto, one of his most interesting comments - considering that he himself is a Protestant - was his observation that historical Protestantism (i.e. the protestant churches which began with the Reformation) was to-day facing its gravest crisis. The protestant churches

said Tillich, have tended to strip away the very substance of the Christian Faith, until in the twentieth century, it has become almost indistinguishable from secular culture. Thus Tillich argues emphatically for what he calls "Catholic substance." He argues that the Sacraments are indispensable, for they are the forms through which the Christian Faith is traditioned from one generation to another. Thus, while we must always be vigilant lest the outward form be acknowledged, and the inward Grace denied, we can never relinquish the forms which preserve the life-giving Grace. We can never relinquish, in other words, the idea of the Church visible.

The Church visible in the twentieth century must bring to the world the life-giving power of the Sacraments; but it must also subject itself to honest and searching criticism, and embark, where necessary, upon a program of courageous reform. We do not suggest that General Synod set up a sub-committee to deal with this question. We are suggesting the kind of action that can be undertaken - to some extent anyway - in every Canadian parish. It might be started by the organization of a few key parishioners on the cell group principle. Perhaps such a group could meet once a week; have supper together, worship together, study together, and adopt a corporate program of action relevant to the needs of that particular parish.

Perhaps such a group could become the really vital power within the parish, a decisive proof that the Christian religion is alive and on the offensive. Whatever the means we may devise to meet it, there can be no doubt whatever that the most urgent religious need of our day is the recovery of significant corporate life within the parish. This is the problem with which every churchman and every parish priest must be chiefly concerned: the purification and intensification of the spiritual life of Christians - the awakening of the real protestant spirit, and the preservation of the life-giving substance of the Catholic religion.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

The subject of science and religion may seem by now to be somewhat hackneyed. The question of their relationship has been discussed for centuries and surely, it may be thought, has been settled long ago. But this is not the case. It is true that the dust has settled in the conflict between the physical sciences and religion, but as far as the social sciences are concerned the issue is still very much alive. The old war has broken out again on new fields.

The fact is that we still live in a scientific age. This means that the ideas which are most effective in shaping our culture are ultimately derived from science. In every age there is some such set of germinal ideas which constitute what may be called the prevailing tradition of the era. This more or less unrecognized but powerful tradition largely determines the nature of the economic, social, and political institutions as well as the current ethical, philosophical, and religious opinions. It foists upon the individuals who live in the period certain assumptions which tend to be regarded as axiomatic and which lead to the rejection of other apparently irreconcilable beliefs. The presuppositions of the scientific tradition which prevails in our age are, to put it mildly, inimical to religious ideas. This is the context of the modern struggle between science and religion in which, for obvious reasons, the former has the odds heavily in its favour.

In any discussion of this subject it is important to realize that if we begin the debate with all the prejudices of the scientific tradition unconsciously but firmly rooted in our minds the outcome is settled in advance. If the argument is to be fairly pursued we must first of all make quite explicit the concealed assumptions which we all inherit from the prevailing tradition.

These assumptions are simply the special principles of science which, in our time, have been transformed into dogmas of universal application. The first principle of science is methodological and stipulates that if a belief is to be regarded as scientific, it must be susceptible of empirical and experimental tests; there must be some kind of sense-experience which is relevant to its truth or falsity. It is, of course, perfectly legitimate for science to lay

down a condition of this kind in its own field. We may call this valid scientific requirement the empirical principle.

The second principle is limiting in nature and follows from the first. Since the scientific method is tied to sense-experience, its investigations must be confined to the physical realm which is the only field accessible to the senses. It is, again, entirely legitimate for science to limit its scope in this way. We may call this valid scientific limitation the materialistic principle.

The third principle is also limiting in nature and follows from the aim of scientific enquiry. The purpose of the scientific method is to discover the general laws by which nature is governed. It is obvious that such laws only exist where events are absolutely regular, unexceptional, and predictable in their occurrence. This kind of behaviour we call, by analogy, mechanical. Scientific investigation is thus limited, by its aim, to the study of mechanical behaviour. We may call this valid scientific limitation the mechanistic principle.

Finally, scientific theories are all hypotheses subject to modification or abandonment in the light of future experience. Science is continually refining and improving its beliefs and is thus infinitely self-correcting and progressive. This gives rise to a fourth principle which is really a certain temper of mind, quite justified in science proper, and which may be called the optimistic principle.

These four valid principles of science are gradually broadened in scope until they cover the whole of life and reality and as such become the unquestioned axioms of the scientific tradition. Science stipulates that only those beliefs which are empirically testable may be called scientific; the scientific tradition assumes that this method is alone capable of discovering truth -- the dogma of scientific omniscience. Science is only concerned with the study of physical reality; the scientific tradition assumes that there is no other kind of reality -- the dogma of meta-physical materialism. Science confines its investigations to the sphere of mechanical behaviour; the scientific tradition assumes that all behaviour is of this type -- the dogma of absolute determinism. Science points out that scientific progress is guaranteed by the nature of its method; the scientific tradition assumes that progress on every level is inevitable -- the dogma of utopianism.

These four dogmas form the substance of the tradition

which has been the major cultural influence in the modern period, and this is what is meant by saying that we live in a scientific age. It is this tradition, of course, and not science proper, which militates against religion. The champions of religion have often made the mistake of confusing these two very different things and have therefore attacked science and its theories when they should have been opposing the scientific tradition and its dogmas; when this occurs we may speak of the conflict between pseudo-religion and genuine science. On the other hand, religion has often been attacked in the name of science by those who were really serving the cause of the scientific tradition; when this happens we may speak of the conflict between pseudo-science and genuine religion. It may also be the case that pseudo-religion and pseudo-science have often locked horns. But the one thing which is certain is that genuine religion and genuine science have always fought on the same side.

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In the 17th century, Isaac Newton, making use of the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and others, constructed a comprehensive and systematic picture of the universe in terms of matter in motion and governed by fixed mechanical laws. Some religious people regarded the Newtonian system as atheistic in the sense that it drove God out of nature. Everything could now be explained in terms of the laws of motion, and the hypothesis of God became unnecessary. What these critics failed to understand was that Newton was looking at nature through scientific spectacles and describing faithfully what he saw through the materialistic and mechanistic lenses; his view was correct, within the limits imposed by the kind of glasses he was wearing. But it is also possible to look at nature through artistic or religious spectacles. The view one gets is very different, but there can be no conflict as long as we admit that what the scientific, artistic, and religious genius sees in nature is really there, and that the differences are due to different perspectives. The difficulties begin when one party insists that his spectacles are the only ones which give the objective truth. Those defenders of religion who made this mistake in the 17th century in regard to the Newtonian physics were victims of pseudo-religion. On the other hand, there were those, like the philosopher Hobbes, who tried to turn the Newtonian theory into the whole, sole, and final truth about reality in general; this is metaphysical materialism and it is the product not of science but of pseudo-science or the scientific tradition.

In the 19th century, Charles Darwin published his theory of evolution with very similar results. There were those who claimed at once that Darwin's hypothesis must be false since it contradicted the Biblical story of creation. They thought that since the Biblical and Darwinian accounts spoke about the same thing in quite different ways, both could not be true. They reduced the profound and beautiful story in Genesis to the same level as a scientific description. Failing to understand that it is possible to look at the same thing from different points of view, they opposed a genuine scientific theory in the name of -- pseudo-religion. On the other hand, certain vociferous champions of the scientific tradition appeared, who tried to do with Darwin's theory what Hobbes had done with Newton's and to explain everything fully and without exception in terms of natural evolution; this is metaphysical naturalism and it is a product not of science but of pseudo-science or the scientific tradition.

Scientific theories as understood by genuine scientists do not claim to be final explanations of the whole of reality but simply descriptions of the limited view of reality which is all that is possible through the spectacles of the scientific method. To say that the scientific view is limited is not, of course, to say that it is false; it is part of the truth, but not the whole truth.

Examples of the apparent conflict between science and religion, which are more contemporary, come from the social sciences. The physical and social sciences differ in their fields but agree in their common method. It was natural enough in the 19th century to assume that the same method which had been so successful in giving man knowledge of and control over his physical environment would be just as fruitful when applied to man himself and to his social environment. The optimistic bias of the scientific tradition produced the expectation that if the scientific understanding of the human field were added to the scientific understanding of the physical field the result would be utopia.

Sociology and psychology began their career as sciences by adopting the empirical principle. This meant, of course, that they must necessarily assume the other three principles, which, under the influence of the prevailing tradition, tended to be taken over as unquestioned and all-inclusive dogmas. Because social scientists often adopt these presuppositions unconsciously they have the habit of producing them triumphantly as the conclusions of their

investigations. Looking at man and his history through the materialistic lens, and therefore seeing neither the providence of God nor the activity of the human spirit nor the reality of universal values, they conclude that the whole human situation must be interpreted in materialistic and relativistic terms. Looking through the mechanistic lens, and therefore being incapable of recognizing the reality of human freedom and the efficacy of the human will, they conclude that all human behaviour is rigidly determined by general laws. Finally, on the basis of the optimistic bias of the scientific tradition, the social sciences tend to suppose that the scientific method will eventually solve all human problems and make man and his society perfect.

Because of their blind acceptance of the assumptions of the prevailing tradition, the social sciences tend to rule out the reality of God, spirit, values, and freedom. Since these are just the features of the human situation in which religion is interested, it was inevitable that conflict should arise between religion and these sciences. Once again, however, an examination of particular examples of such strife shows that these are never cases of clear contradiction between a genuine hypothesis of the social sciences and an authentic religious belief. All the instances turn out to be quarrels either between a well-substantiated theory of sociology or psychology, and a misunderstood religious insight (pseudo-religion) or else between a genuine religious conviction and a sociological or psychological dogma which is actually a product of the scientific tradition (pseudo-science).

In the 19th century Karl Marx regarded himself as a scientist applying the scientific method to the study of society, with a view to improving and finally perfecting the social structure. The result of his researches was the theory that all social institutions are determined in their nature by the economic foundation; and since man is what he is because of his social relations, all human beliefs, actions, and history are the products of economic forces. If man and society have been imperfect, the fault lies with the economic systems which have hitherto existed; the solution of all problems is to be sought in the scientifically perfected economy. Religion, like all other cultural manifestations, is simply the rationalization of the existing economic structure, serving to conceal its defects by directing attention to another world.

Religion can quarrel with Marxism in two different ways, oneright and one wrong. The right way to criticize

Marx is to point out that he was looking at society through the limiting lenses of the scientific spectacles, and therefore his view was restricted to the material and impersonally determining factors in social history. The most important of these is undoubtedly the economic, and Marx' great contribution was to analyze this social determinant exhaustively and brilliantly, and to suggest certain ways of improving its operation which have been widely adopted since his time. In all this, Marx was simply being faithful to the materialistic and mechanistic principles of science. But when he went on to assert that economic factors are the only social reality and that they entirely determine everything which a society and its members think, do, and are, and that the scientific economic system will produce perfect human beings, then he was the victim of the materialistic, deterministic, and utopian dogmas of the scientific tradition and was speaking on behalf of pseudo-science. Actually, of course, there are a host of other determining factors in history, above all the purposes of God and the spirit and freedom of man. When religion speaks in this way against pseudo-scientific sociology, then it is the voice of genuine religion challenging the illegitimate assertions of economic materialism which, it should be remembered, is widely preached even in non-Marxist sociological circles.

The wrong way in which to oppose Marxism, and economic determinism and cultural relativism in general, is to refuse to admit the important role which economic and other material factors play in shaping culture and individual character, including the forms of religion. Marx discovered a real truth here and to ignore or deny it is the mark of pseudo-religion which is here in conflict with a well-substantiated sociological theory. We may even have to admit that often the operative motive in the vigorous defence of religious ideas is the unconscious recognition of their efficacy in helping to preserve the social status quo in the face of revolutionary movements which threaten the material interests of a privileged class. It must be added, however, that the fact that sordid motives sometimes lie behind belief in God does not prove, as Marx thought, that the idea of God is an illusion. The motives which lead us to adopt certain ideas have nothing to do with their objective truth or falsity.

At about the same time that Marx was using the scientific method in the investigation of human society, Sigmund Freud was employing it in the study of the human psyche. The result was his famous theory that the essence

and fundamental driving force of human nature is the sex instinct. This is the all-powerful determinant of everything which men think, do, feel, and are. Sexuality exercises this power for the most part indirectly, due to the fact that society imposes taboos on its natural expression, thus forcing it down into the unconscious and compelling it to seek satisfaction along devious routes and in various disguises. It is for this reason that the resulting life-pattern is usually neurotic.

Freud also offered the cure for this unfortunate state of affairs in the form of psycho-analysis for the individual and a new kind of education for society. In the new education, based on psycho-analytical principles, morality and religion will be abolished. For morality is nothing but the set of social conventions which unnaturally repress the sex instinct, and religion is the set of false beliefs which provide the sanctions for morality in the shape of threats and promises to be carried out by God after death. The idea of God is an illusion which arises as the result of infantile experiences. As children we believe that our fathers are all-powerful and all-good. In the process of growing up we are disillusioned in both respects, but we still crave the protection of an almighty and beneficent male parent. We project the image of such a being into the heavens and call it our heavenly father who becomes, at the same time, the guarantor of the neurotic taboos which we call morality.

Religion can come into conflict with Freudianism, and modern scientific psychology in general, in two ways, one right and one wrong. The right way is to admit the partial truth of the Freudian analysis as a brilliant description of the limited view of the human psyche which is all that the scientific method can gain. Part of the truth about man is that he is a child of nature constituted by blind but dynamic instincts, of which one of the most important is sexuality; but he is also a child of God endowed with a spirit which is made in the image of God. Part of the truth about human behaviour is that it is determined, like the behaviour of animals, by the drives of instinct; but if the spirit of God was also breathed into man then he is also capable of genuine freedom. Part of the truth about the special forms which our ethical standards take is that they are relative to particular social and psychological circumstances; but this by no means exhaustively explains them; there are certain universal human values, like truth, justice, fidelity, without which the whole scientific enterprise itself, for instance, would be pointless,

inexplicable, and impossible. Further, it may be even necessary to admit that the idea of God, in some cases, may have its origin and character correctly explained in Freudian terms; but this does not prove, as Freud thought, that the idea is an illusion; for the truth or falsity of an idea is in no way affected by its psychological genesis. Finally, it is true that psycho-analytical methods are capable of greatly benefiting those aspects of the human psyche with which it is capable of dealing; but there are reaches of the human psyche to which science is blind, and in this area, where the crucial issues are joined, only God can help.

Freud examined the human soul through scientific spectacles with the inevitable results. Looking through the materialistic lens, he was bound to interpret man naturalistically in terms of some natural instinct like sex (naturalism). Looking at him through the mechanistic lens, he was bound to discover that his behaviour was entirely determined by natural forces (determinism), and that all his values were simply conventions imposed by society (relativism). Finally, in accordance with the optimistic principle, it was inevitable that he should assume that human nature is indefinitely perfectible by scientific methods (utopianism). Naturalism, determinism, relativism, and utopianism are as ubiquitous in modern psychology as in modern sociology. Where they are regarded as merely the working principles of science, defining the method and limiting the field of investigation, they are unobjectionable. But when, as is often the case under the influence of the scientific tradition, they are paraded as all-embracing and final conclusions about man, then, as involving the rejection of God, spirit, freedom and values, they must be resolutely and persistently challenged. If the battle is waged in this way, it is a case of genuine religion resisting the illicit generalizations of pseudo-science.

The wrong way in which religion sometimes attacks the findings of modern psychology is to refuse to admit the truth of its well-substantiated hypotheses. There is a tendency to deny the reality and power of the purely animal part of human nature, the conventional element in man-made norms of conduct, the often unwholesome origin of religious ideas, and the degree to which scientific therapy can assist in the cure of souls. Such an attitude is the obscurantism of pseudo-religion confronting the discoveries of genuine science. Like scientific sociology, scientific psychology also adds greatly to our knowledge of and control over the

human situation. It is only when the exponents of these sciences fall victim to the scientific tradition and advance the limiting principles of science as though they were universal truths which could exhaustively explain and solve all human problems, that religion must stand in implacable and aggressive opposition.

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Pseudo-science is the characteristic aberration of a scientific age and is the result of the transformation of the valid principles of science into absolute dogmas. The empirical principle becomes the dogma which claims omniscience for the scientific method; the materialistic principle becomes the dogma which claims that the physical is alone real; the mechanistic principle becomes the dogma which claims that all behaviour is rigidly determined by natural laws; the optimistic principle becomes the dogma of inevitable progress.

In the physical sciences, Newton and Darwin were genuine scientists, describing accurately what they saw, by the aid of the scientific method, in inanimate and animate nature. But pseudo-scientists at once appeared who generalized these hypotheses into metaphysical systems of materialism and naturalism, posing as final truths about reality as a whole. In the social sciences, Marx and Freud combined in their own persons both the genuine scientist and the pseudo-scientist. In the former role, they described carefully what they saw, by the aid of the scientific method, in human society and the human psyche. In the latter role, taking over without question the older metaphysical systems of materialism and naturalism, they generalized their scientific hypotheses into the all-inclusive dogmas of determinism, relativism, and utopianism, pretentiously claiming to give the last word about human life and destiny.

What pseudo-religion does is to confuse science and pseudo-science, and when it should be resisting the latter actually attacks the former. This procedure, naturally enough, creates the impression that religion is reactionary and anti-scientific.

The history of the actual conflicts between science and religion shows clearly that, in every case, the quarrel is either between pseudo-religion and genuine science or between pseudo-science and genuine religion. True religion and true science never come to blows but rather always co-operate in the education of mankind.

D. R. G. Owen

SUFFRAGANS

The present diocesan organization of the Church of England in Canada is unsatisfactory from many points of view, and not least in its provision for Episcopal oversight. Probably no office has been more misunderstood or more maligned than that of Bishop; nor has this been due entirely to the character or ability of those holding that office. The Church in Canada has had many able and saintly Bishops, but the office has defeated many, and has curtailed the activity of many more in those fields in which they were particularly gifted. The time has come for the Church in Canada to re-examine the nature and function of the Episcopate so as to give its members greater opportunity to exercise those duties which are inherent in their Order.

It is not the purpose of this paper to defend any particular theory of Episcopacy, but the writer assumes a certain attitude towards Bishops which ought to be stated at the beginning. There are those who feel that Bishops are of the esse of the Church, and there are others who hold that the Episcopate is of the bene esse only. The decision that Bishops are of the bene esse only must rest in the final analysis upon a pragmatic basis, but no one with even a modicum of respect for the truth could conscientiously affirm, in the light of history and in face of the contemporary scene, that the Church is appreciably healthier spiritually because she has Bishops; indeed, there have been times when exactly the opposite might have been said with some degree of assurance. The fact of the matter is that, to give any adequate excuse for retaining Bishops, we are forced to rely upon arguments which make Bishops of the esse of the Church, for the very good reason that any other sort of argument destroys that which makes a Bishop a Bishop in any sense which the Church through the ages might recognize. That is to say, the argument that Bishops are only of the bene esse of the Church alters the concept of the nature and function of a Bishop so that we are no longer speaking of that Office and Order which the Church has always called Bishop. This paper, therefore, assumes that the Bishop is of the esse of the Church.

The weakness of the Canadian Episcopate is most clearly seen in two fields, viz: the pastoral and the teaching. Through the ages the administrative accretions to the office

of Bishop have gradually reduced the time available to Bishops to direct their attention to pastoral oversight and doctrinal stimulation. What this has meant to the individual Bishop is illustrated by Charges to Synods which are dull, arid, and more akin to the report of the general manager of a commercial enterprise than to the challenge of a spiritual leader to his people. Its effect upon the Parish Priest is often scarcely less disastrous. Many are cut off from their Diocesans by long distances: many indeed are a day's journey from their nearest clerical neighbour. There is no one of experience to talk over problems, to give advice, to encourage, to admonish and stir up if need be. The lonely Priest must face his problems without the assistance of the Chief Pastor. He must decide difficult points of morality, both in his own life and in the lives of his people, without assistance from the Overseer of the Faith, because the Episcopal office has many calls to answer and must deal with them in turn; and, besides, the Bishop is so far from the scene that he cannot know the niceties of each problem.

We say that there have been Bishops, Priests and Deacons in the Church "from the Apostles' time". Many of our people might well question why, because the Bishop is such a rare visitor that the people might feel we could just as well do without him. We appeal to the "Ancient Authors": let us pay heed to what they have to say. Writing to the Smyrnaeans in the second century, St. Ignatius of Antioch had this to say: "Let no one do anything touching the Church, apart from the Bishop", and again, to the Philadelphians: "Apart from the Bishop do nothing".

But if we are to be loyal to the tradition of the Church and to the teaching of the Fathers, we must show the world that the Bishop is in the Church, that he is not merely an invisible and distant potentate charged with certain administrative duties, but that the Church has in the Bishop "a type of the Father". This will require the more frequent presence of the Episcopate in all parts of the Church, so that both people and Priests will know and understand that the Church is complete only in the presence of the Bishop.

What we need in the Canadian Church is more Pastoral Oversight, a function which is inherent in the Office of a Bishop. It is manifestly impossible for any man far removed from the scene to give adequate advice on parochial problems: it is equally difficult for him to keep abreast

of theological thought when his time is so fully occupied with office routine. Yet the work needs to be done. The whole Church would be strengthened by Bishops on the spot, working with their Priests, witnessing to the Faith.

There is no reason why the Church in Canada should not use the Office of Bishop Suffragan on a fairly wide scale. We have many able Priests with wide pastoral experience who would add strength to the Bench and contribute greatly to the effective working of the Church. Suffragan Bishops would correct the absence of oversight. Their assistance would be invaluable to the over-worked Diocesan; their presence in the area of their own jurisdiction an encouragement to the clergy, an example to the laity, and a visible sign of the Apostolic Faith and Ministry.

The Diocesan would have at all times a colleague on the spot knowing the clergy and people, able to speak with certain knowledge of the problems and potentialities of his area, directing all the efforts of the Church towards the wider fulfilment of her true spiritual purpose. It would be possible then for the Diocesan to give more attention to the wider affairs of the Church, to keep abreast of developing theology, and to make decisions on Church polity of weightier spiritual effect than at present seems possible. From his position at the centre of affairs, the Diocesan, relieved of much routine, would be able to give that oversight to the teaching of the Church which emphasized so much by the early Fathers as part of his particular function in the Church.

There is no desire to evade the difficulties which the appointment of Suffragans would entail. It is impossible to increase the number of Diocesans for financial reasons alone, but it should be remembered that a large salary and an office staff are not of the esse of the Episcopate. The necessity for an enlargement of the Canadian Bench of Bishops remains, and the financial provision for Suffragans should present no insurmountable difficulty.

Another problem would be that of appointment. Some modification in the present system would be necessary because of the special relationship in which a Suffragan stands to his Diocesan. Such a departure would make no difference to the method of electing Diocesans, because a Suffragan would require election anyway if he were to become a Diocesan himself.

These problems are, however, quite secondary. What we

need is a realization of the true function and place of the Episcopate in the Church, and the example of the Church through the centuries is before us. The ideal is to have a Bishop in every centre of any size, but if that is impossible, we should at least have two or three assistants in every Diocese. Our system in Canada at present mutilates the Church by restricting its most important office to a few over-worked men. This weakness at the top is felt through the whole Church, and this at a time when the witness of the Church ought to be strong. We must strengthen the Church for her task in an unbelieving world.

Wm. C. MacVean

